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1. Introduction 
We want better lives for ourselves, and for our family and friends. 
We also want to live in a just society. What is the connection between 
these two goals? In this lecture I discuss the importance of that question 
for both political practice and political theory. It is a standard assump-
tion of political philosophy, including liberal theory, that redistributive 
programs impose losses or sacrifices on the part of those who must pay 
higher taxes. Liberals regard those sacrifices as reasonable; indeed they 
believe that justice requires greater equality because such sacrifices are 
reasonable. But in contemporry politics the electorate often reaches the 
opposite conclusion: that is unreasonable to ask the majority to make the 
sacrifices that further redistribution would now require. It might 
therefore be wise to re-examine the assumption that measures aimed at 
greater justice involve genuine sacrifices for those who lose financially. If 
we reject that view of the connection between well-being and justice, I 
shall argue, we undercut the standard liberal arguments for greater 
equality. But we also undercut the most powerful contemporary argu-
ments against it. I shall not be able to begin any substantial discussion of 
the different kind of political argument that must then be made either for 
or against economic equality, though the general character of the 
argument I think is needed may emerge.• 
2. Contemporary Politics 
I just described an argument for greater economic equality: though 
greater equality means less resources for some people, and so a sacrifice 
for them compared to the slalus quo, it would be unreasonable for them to 
refuse to make that sacrifice. This argument uses what we might call the 
comparative-sacrifice test of what justice requires: we compare the 
welfare sacrifices people at different economic levels make in accepting 
one general economic arrangement rather than another, and we ask 
which sacrifices, all things considered, seem most reasonable to ask and 
unreasonable to refuse. Thomas Scanlon's account of contractualism 
makes judgments about the reasonableness of different kinds of sacrifice 
central. An economic structure, he says, is just if it cannot reasonably be 
rejected by people anxious to reach an unforced and informed agree-
ment. Thomas Nagel proposes a similar exercise, but he emphasizes the 
limits as well as the strength of this kind of argument in the service of 
equality. He believes that it would not be unreasonable of the rich in 
Western societies to refuse to accept John Rawls' difference principle, 
which requires that economic arrangements be in the best interests of 
the worst off group, if that principle were applied across nations to 
require mammoth transfers to underdeveloped countries. But Nagel 
does think it is unreasonable of well-off people in America and Britain 
not to try to satisfy the difference principle in their own communities. 
They are unreasonable, he thinks, not to accept sacrifices in the form of 
substantially higher taxes in order to make the situation of the poor as 
good as it can be. 
There is an historical basis for this appeal to reasonableness in the 
service of equality. Reason and the reasonable played an important role 
in the genesis and appeal of liberal ideals. In the 18th century liberalism 
was a radical philosophy whose target was clearly marked. The enemy of 
the liberal spirit was privilege: of person and birth, of creed and nation. 
As liberalism matured into a coherent and general political attitude, it 
denied privilege in one sphere after another. First title and rank, then 
race and sex and personal moral conviction, and finally merit or talent 
or contribution, became for liberals illegitimate grounds of entitlement 
or preference. 
Liberalism offered a competing picture of how people should be 
thought to be associated in civil society: not divided by lines of privilege 
or caste or ability, but inherently equal in worth and dignity. Liberal 
statesmen and politicians designed political structures and institutions fit 
for people who conceived themselves that way. They said that these were 
the institutions that would be chosen by reasonable people of good will, 
who treated each other as equals and who were anxious to live together 
in mutual and reasonable accommodation, none stubbornly insisting on 
his own interests or values, all sensitive to the interests and values of 
others. 
For centuries that way of understanding politics encouraged toler-
ance and promoted dissatisfaction with inequality. If privilege of faith or 
conviction is rejected, if people are equal in dignity and worth, then it is 
unreasonable, because arbitrary, that one religion should be established 
and others forbidden. If privilege of all others sorts is denied, then it is 
equally unreasonable, because arbitrary, that a large working class 
should labor for only a small share of the surplus most of which is 
consumed by the capital-owning and managerial few, who are no more 
entitled to it than anyone else. 
Today, however, the enemy of liberal equality is not privilege but 
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number, and reasonableness is a two-edged sword. The public argument 
for criminalizing homosexuality, for example, is publicly based not on 
any claim that homosexuals arc evil or less worthy of public concern, but 
rather on the very different and more complex argument that the 
majority is entitled to construct the moral environment it prefers. 
Arguments against greater equality have changed in a parallel way. The 
recent debate in the United States over tax policy is instructive. 
Conservatives who oppose higher taxes for redistribution no longer 
claim privilege for the rich, as conservatives once claimed for nobility. 
They no longer claim even that the rich are entitled to keep what they 
earn in the market because they have greater merit or talent at making 
money, or even because they have contributed more to the economy. 
Indeed, privilege of birth or class has played next to no part in national 
politics for many decades. The entitlement of talent remains a somewhat 
more lively idea, but its force in politics is actually very small, even in 
Britain where Margaret Thatcher did her best to revive it. 
Conservatism is now consequentialist. Arguments about privilege 
have been replaced by appeals to economic indicators. Republican 
presidents argue that welfare and other redistributive programs are bad 
for most people, that they arc inflationary and destructive ofthe nation's 
power to compete in the economy of the world. They argue for lower 
taxes not on the principle that taxation is theft, or that the rich deserve to 
keep the fruits of their talents, but on the ground that incentives will lead 
the rich to work harder or invest more. Republicans also point out, to 
even greater political effect, that any serious redistribution of wealth 
would require substantially greater taxation not only of the rich, who 
collectively have too little money to matter, but of the middle and 
working classes, that is, of the great majority. Redistribution, they 
claim, would mean considerable sacrifice by the many for the sake of 
relatively few. 
It is not immediately or evidently clear that a conversation among 
reasonable people who accepted these economic claims would settle on 
further redistribution of wealth. I do not mean the opposite: that they 
would agree that redistribution is unreasonable. But just that the idea of 
reasonableness, whose force is most evident as an antidote to privilege, 
has no independent power to influence an economic decision one way or 
the other when that decision balances losses for large numbers against 
gains for fewer people lower down. The contrast between the reasonable 
and the arbitrary no longer seems pertinent and neither view-that 
redistribution is reasonable or that it is unreasonable-seems the 
inevitable result of sensible people of good will reasoning together. 
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Nor do I mean that philosophical utilitarianism is a reasonable 
doctrine, or that liberal philosophers like Scanlon and Nagel and Rawls 
have no effective arguments against it. I am not discussing whether 
gains to the majority could reasonably be thought to justify extreme 
suffering to a minority, or denial of fundamental human rights, or 
anything of comparable drama or horror. The question is whether 
someone who is reasonable, in the ordinary and familiar sense of that 
idea, could resist the claim that the great majority of Americans should 
now make greater sacrifices to raise the living standards of the relatively 
few at the bottom above a decent minimum. I myself think the majority 
should accept greater taxes, and no doubt many of you do too. But I 
cannot think that this follows from some independent ideal of reasonable 
behavior, or that those who disagree are unreasonable people. 
That fact is reflected, I think, in the unease several liberal philoso-
phers now feel about whether Rawls' difference principle is the right 
formulation ofliberal equality after all. That principle now strikes many 
who accept the sacrifice view of justice as too strict: it seems not 
reasonable but unreasonable that justice should be sensitive only to the 
question whether those who gain from some political program are at the 
economic bottom, and wholly insensitive to the question of how much 
people who are further up the ladder lose or gain, either collectively or 
individually. But it is not plain how we could construct any more 
complex principle to decide, in some general and constitutional way, 
which sacrifices are reasonable or unreasonable once all the facts the 
difference principle screens out are re-admitted. If liberal philosophers 
can supply only a vague and commodious principle, which instructs us 
to judge the reasonableness of a particular political decision all things 
considered case by case, then it will prove even harder to convince 
citizens that reasonableness in fact requires the kind of sacrifice that 
conservative politicians assure them, in a more welcome way, it is 
perfectly reasonable of them to reject. 
3. The Independence Thesis 
The comparative-sacrifice test of justice plainly presupposes some 
view about the connection between well-being and justice. But which 
one? One popular view, which I shall call the independence thesis, 
provides a natural answer. According to the independence thesis, our 
desire for good lives for ourselves and our desire for a just society are 
distinct aims: how good someone's life is for him can be judged 
independently of any opinion about the justice or injustice of the social 
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and political arrangements in which his life is lived. Suppose I am rich, 
and therefore have a large and beautiful house, an interesting job and 
enticing vacations. Whether my life is therefore a good one may be 
debatable; but according to the independence view the answer is not 
affected by whether the society in which I acquired my wealth is just or 
unjust. Suppose I want very much to live in a just society, and that I am 
willing to sacrifice my wealth to achieve it. That means, according to 
this thesis, that I am not self-centered, that I care about more than my 
own life, that I have other-regarding as well as self-regarding desires. 
But it does not mean that my. own life goes better, that my self-regarding 
desires arc better satisfied, when my wealth is halved by the re-
distributive taxes I spent my life working to enact. On the contrary, my 
own life would be much less good in that case: that is why what I have 
done should be regarded as a sacrifice. 
The independence view assumes a particular moral psychology, 
which might be described using Rawls's account of the public concep-
tion of the self. He says that people have two moral capacities: they have 
the ability to design and revise conceptions of the good life for 
themselves, and they have the ability to develop and apply a sense of 
justice. The independence thesis insists that only the first of these 
capacities is pertinent to somcone's own good or well-being. It insists 
that someone who wants justice even at the cost to his other interests is 
sacrificing his own good rather than redefining it. So a rich person who 
accepts redistributive taxation is indeed accepting a sacrifice, though it 
does not automatically follow that the sacrifice is unreasonable or should 
not be demanded. The independence thesis is therefore a natural 
companion to the comparative-sacrifice test for justice, because the latter 
logically requires that the sacrifice someone makes, in accepting a 
particular change in his circumstances, be measured without reference 
to the justice of the change, and the former guarantees that this can be 
done. 
But the independence view is far from evidently the right view about 
the connection between welfare and justice: it can be challenged in a 
variety of ways. We should now consider, therefore, how it might be 
challenged in such a way as also to challenge the assumption at the heart 
of the modern debate about justice: that people who pay more taxes in 
the interests of justice suffer or sacrifice in their own lives. We do not 
challenge the independence view, of course, simply by pointing out what 
it concedes: that many people actually want to live in a just society, and 
would be willing to make sacrifices to achieve that goal. We need an 
account that rejects the independence thesis by bringing justice into well-
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being in some way. We might follow either of two strategies in trying to 
construct such an account: we might try to show that justice is a 
component or part of well-being, or we might try to show a different and 
more fundamental connection between the two: that justice is in some 
way or to some degree a condition of well-being. 
The former proposal, that justice is a component of well-being, is 
easier to understand or at least to state than the latter, though it is more 
complex than it might first appear. In fact I shall state the component 
proposal in two forms or versions. The first counts justice as one among 
many components of a good life, none of which is inherently privileged 
against the others. Many people do take that view: they consider living 
in a just society to be among the things that make for a good life. All else 
equal, that is, they would rather that their society be a just one, for their 
own sake as well as for the sake of others. or course people who have 
that taste also want other things: comfortable, attractive homes, fast, 
safe automobiles, and extended and interesting vacations, for example. 
They may find these various preferences in conflict, as desires often are 
when resources are scarce. Just as they might have to balance their 
desires for fast cars against their taste for collecting paintings, to decide 
which is in the end more important to them, so they might have to 
balance all their other wishes against their desire to live in a just society 
in order to decide whether they really would be worse off, on balance, if 
taxes were higher. 
This is not an implausible account of how some people think about 
their own welfare: they would accept that living in a reasonably just 
community is an important aspect of their well-being. It is another 
question, of course, how many people take that view, or could be 
persuaded to it. We need not speculate about that, however, because this 
general account of how justice affects welfare, which treats the first as an 
aspect or component of the second, is in any case not adequate to the 
purpose I described. It does not require revising the view that people 
who pay more taxes to improve equality arc making a sacrifice that 
might be thought unreasonable. 
Suppose the general public in America were indeed convinced that 
living in a just community makes an important contribution to their 
own welfare. They would still need some way to decide whether justice 
really does require greater equality. They might plausibly think that this 
depends on whether the sacrifices they and others would make in 
accepting egalitarian programs would be reasonable, judged in terms of 
the loss they would suffer in the other, material, components of their 
well-being, judged, that is, prescinding from any question of the value of 
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justice itself. They would bracket the question of the contribution justice 
itself makes to people's well-being and then consider whether the 
material sacrifice required by egalitarian policies would be, all things 
considered, reasonable. If it seemed to most people, as I fear it might, 
that the sacrifices were not reasonable, then they would take fresh and 
renewed pleasure in the present arrangement. It works not only to their 
financial advantage, they would think, but makes a further contribution 
to their welfare in virtue of the fact that it is a just arrangement as well. 
I do not intend irony. People who believe that justice contributes to 
their well-being, as a component in the way we arc now considering, 
would be right to bracket that contribution when they arc thinking about 
which arrangements are actually just. For even though they agree that 
they have a common interest in achieving a just society, they know that 
they can have antagonistic interests in almost everything else, and it 
seems natural to debate about which economic institutions are just by 
considering how different institutions would resolve those remaining 
conflicting interests. If redistribution in the direction of equality would 
involve substantial sacrifices for a great many people in those other 
interests, and gains for only a relatively few, then there is no evident 
reason why that is reasonable, and so no evident reason why greater 
equality would be a gain in justice. 
So the first form of the component strategy, which makes justice just 
one component of well-being among others, is a poor one for our 
purposes. Now we must consider the second form of the component 
strategy, which takes justice to be not just one component of well-being 
among others, but a dominant or re~:,JUlative component. The best 
example is found in Rawls's discussion of the good in part III of A Theory 
of justice. He argues that justice and self-interest are congruent because it 
is part of people's good to realize both their highest-order capacities, 
which, as I said, consist in a capacity to frame, revise and follow a 
conception of the good, and a capacity for justice, that is, to act upon 
regulative principles of right. That is very different from the independ-
ence thesis, which insists that people who defer to a sense of justice, 
because they want to live in a just society, are acting against rather than 
in their own interests. People who accept the Rawlsian account of their 
own good or well-being, and who are members of what he calls a well-
ordered community, will not be tempted to think that they might be even 
better off if the community became unjust in a way that provided more 
goods for them. So the question I set aside in considering the simpler 
version of the component strategy-how many people are likely to count 
justice sufficiently important to outweigh a substantial loss in other 
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resources-does not arise if we assume that people accept this stronger 
form of the component claim. 
But the other difficulties I identified remain, and in just as striking a 
form. For even people who accept Rawls's account of their higher-order 
capacities, and of the way both capacities figure in their well-being, need 
some way of deciding which distributions are just, and they have no 
reason not to think that this is a matter of which sacrifices in primary 
goods, on the part of those who could have more under some other 
economic arrangement, arc reasonable all things considered. They have 
no reason, that is, not to prescind from questions of justice in making 
that calculation. That explains why they are free to judge what is 
reasonable through the device of Rawls's original position. The parties 
in that position do not take their good to be a matter of exercising 
higher-order capacities in the right way; on the contrary they accept the 
independence thesis, in the shape of what Rawls calls a thin theory of the 
good. The thin theory assumes that it is in each person's interest to have 
as many primary goods as possible, and that this is not affected by the 
justice or injustice of the distribution that assigns him more. The 
principles that people who have that independence view of their own 
well-being would choose, Rawls says, are the principles of justice that 
you and I, in spite of the fact that we ourselves reject the independence 
view, should follow in exercising our capacity for justice. So if you and I 
are dissatisfied with Rawls's claim that people with the full-independ-
ence view, acting behind the veil of ignorance, would choose his 
difference principle, or any principle very close in spirit to it, then we 
have no reason to accept that justice requires substantial sacrifices for 
greater equality. We have no reason even though we reject their view of 
the connection between justice and well-being and accept Rawls's own, 
very different, congruence view. 
The key point is this. We arc seeking an account of the connection 
between justice and well-being that will weaken the claim that further 
advances toward equality involve sacrifices on the part of the majority. 
We can weaken that claim either by displacing the comparative-sacrifice 
test altogether or altering its results. But neither form of the component 
theory has either of these consequences. If we would not think it 
unreasonable to refuse greater equality if we accepted the independence 
thesis, then we would not think it unreasonable if we held that justice is a 
component of well-being, whether in the simpler form, which holds that 
justice is one among many different things people desire, or in the 
stronger form which insists that justice is a higher- or highest-order 
good. We must therefore explore the other possibility I mentioned: that 
8 
justice is not any kind of component of well-being, but in some way a 
background condition of the various experiences or achievements that 
arc pan of well-being having the full value that they might. 
I shall not consider the strongest form that claim might take: that 
other components of well-being, like large homes, interesting work and 
travel, are worthless unless the community in which these arc enjoyed is 
a fully just one. I shall describe and try to illustrate a more moderate 
form of the claim; that the force of these goods, as contributions to an 
overall good life, is diminished in an unjust community so that they do 
not have the value they would have in just conditions. Suppose we came 
to accept that view of how justice affects well-being. Then we could not 
prescind from justice in assessing our well-being in the way we can when 
we regard justice as only a component of our welfare. For we would then 
have no way to identify or measure or compare sacrifices without 
making assumptions about justice. It is far from clear how we could 
think about justice if we accepted this more radical view about the way 
in which justice affects well-being. But it is at least clear that we could no 
longer use the comparative-sacrifice style of argument, because we 
would not then assume that people's interests were, even apart from 
their common interest in justice, divergent and antagonistic. We could 
no longer think of justice as consisting in the fairest or most reasonable 
balance of sacrifices. 
4. Critical Well-being 
In this and the next section I shall try to describe a particular version 
of the theory that makes justice a condition and not just a component of 
well-being. 2 I call this version the parameter thesis. It assumes that 
someonc's well-being must be judged in terms of how adequately that 
person has responded to the challenges and constraints of his culture and 
circumstance, and insists that these constraints include parameters of 
fairness and justice. I realize how mysterious that sounds, but I can 
make it seem less so only with the help of a distinction I must first 
explain. 
This is the important distinction between two senses or concepts of 
well-being: volitional and critical. Somcone's volitional well-being is 
improved, and just for that reason, when he has or achieves whatever in 
fact he wants. His critical well-being, on the other hand, is improved by 
his having or achieving what he should want, that is, the achievements or 
experiences that it would make his life a worse one not to want. 
Travelling to exotic places, eating delicious meals, and sailing well are 
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all, as it happens, part of my own volitional well-being: I want all these, 
and my life therefore goes better, in the volitional sense, when I have 
them. But I also want other things, and in a different way, I want to have 
close relationships with my family, to do good work at my job, and to 
have some scant knowledge of the most important scientific theories and 
developments of my time. I take a different view of the importance of 
wanting and having this second group of experiences and achievements. 
I think that my life would not just be less pleasant but a poorer life-that 
it would be wasted in some way-if I did not achieve them, and that it 
would be worse still if I did not even want them. 
That is not true of the first group-the interests I called volitional. 
My life is not a worse life to have livcd-I have nothing to take shame 
in-just because I have not eaten as many good meals as I would have 
enjoyed eating. And though I would like to sail well, and am disap-
pointed because I cannot, I do not think that my life would be a worse 
one if I had never conceived that desire. It is important for me to sail 
well because I want to sail well, not vice versa. All this is reversed, 
however, when I consider the importance of being close to my children. 
I do think my life would have been worse had I never understood the 
importance of this, if I had not suffered pain at estrangement. Having a 
close relationship with my children is not important just because I 
happen to want it; on the contrary, I want it because I believe a life 
without such relationships is a worse one. 
I must not exaggerate the distinction: the two kinds of interests arc 
interconnected in various ways. Critical interests normally track voli-
tional ones. Once I have embraced some desire-to sail well-it is 
normally in my critical interest to succeed, not because sailing well is 
critically important but because a fair measure of success in what I 
happen to want is. And volitional interest normally tracks critical 
interest: people generally want what they think it is in their critical 
interests to have. If they think it in their critical interest to have close 
relationships with their children, they will want to do so. But that is not 
inevitably the case. At least part of the complex problem philosophers 
call ahasia arises because people do not actually want what they believe 
it in their critical interest to have. So I may think that my life would be a 
better life, in the critical sense, if I worked less and spent more time with 
my family, and yet I find that I actually don't want to, or don't want to 
enough.3 
The parameter view I started to describe could not be thought, at 
least for most people, now, a plausible account of well-being in the 
volitional sense. Given what most Americans now want, it would be silly 
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to deny that even the rich could do better, in getting what they want, 
with even more money. But it is not so obviously silly to think that most 
Americans could lead better lives in the critical sense if they lived in a 
more just society, and that is what the parameter thesis claims. 
5. The Character of Living Well 
I shall assume, then, that people have critical interests. There are 
better and worse ways for us to lead our lives, and that doesn't mean just 
that some ways of living would give us more enjoyment or pleasure or 
less suffering. But then what does it mean? In what way, other than in 
being enjoyable, can one's life be a better life to lead? These are the 
questions of philosophical ethics, and it is hard to get a grip on them. 
Perhaps we can do so only through analogies, that is, by trying to 
understand the value of a good life as having the same structure as some 
other kind of thing we believe to be valuable. With that hope, I begin by 
offering a very short catalogue of ways we might think about good lives. 
I begin with an analogy to instrumental value. We value many 
things for their consequences, for their role in producing something else 
we value in a less instrumental way. So we might say that a particular life 
is a good one if it has a good impact on the rest of the world, if it makes 
the world a better place of its having been lived. It is easy to say, on this 
impact model, that Mozart's life, in spite of his hardships and his early 
death, was a marvelous life because his music is so wonderful. We might 
say the same about Martin Luther King's life, or that of Louis Pasteur. 
We might prefer, however, a second analogy, which offers a container 
model of critical well-being. Some things, like museums, are valuable 
because they are places where valuable things are collected and arranged 
together. So we might think that a good life is a life that has good things 
in it. We might agree, to a considerable extent, on a shopping list of 
good things: friendships, achievement, pleasure, satisfaction, aesthetic 
sensibility, travel, diversity, knowledge, and so forth. These are all 
things many people not only want but believe they should want, and we 
might therefore think that a life is a good one if it contains these and 
other good things. 
In a set oflectures I mentioned in a footnote above, I suggested that 
neither of these two analogies or models can in the end capture the most 
important part of the ethical experience of most people. 4 I argued for a 
third model, a third account of the character of the value that a good life 
has, which I call the response account. On this view, a life is a good one in 
virtue of being an appropriate response to the opportunities and 
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challenges provided by the circumstances in which it is lived. I can offer 
you two more specific analogies in clarification of that idea; each of these 
is somewhat misleading, but I hope the pair will give you some better 
idea of what I mean. 
Consider first the value of a brilliant athletic performance: a brilliant 
dive, a brilliant race, a brilliant catch. The brilliance of each lies in large 
part in its being a superb response to very specific circumstances. The 
brilliant race is run over the right distance and in the right way, that is, 
conformably with the rules. There is no such thing, one might say, as a 
brilliant athletic performance in the abstract. It is only so considered as 
response to a challenge offered by the rules and other features of the 
actual situation. Now consider the value of a great artistic performance. 
If you think, as I do, that there is no such thing as a masterly artistic 
performance in the abstract either, then you think that what makes a 
particular painting, painted at a particular time, a great work of art lies 
in its success judged as a response to the artistic tradition against which 
and within which it was painted, and to other features of the social or 
political environment. Art is in that way indexed to culture and 
circumstance: we value it as a response to a particular challenge 
presented by a tradition. The response model of a good life is struc-
turally similar to these conceptions of athletic and artistic value. Like 
athletics and art, living well cannot be defined in the abstract. There is 
no such thing as just living well: people live well by making the 
appropriate response to their physical powers and circumstances, to 
their expected life span, to their culture and the expectations of their 
society, and to the economy of supply and demand in which they find 
themselves. 
If we saw ethics mainly from the perspective of the impact analogy, 
we would think the parameter view about the connection between ethics 
and politics plainly wrong. Many people have had great impact on the 
world with scanty resources. But in general the more wealth one has the 
more impact one can have in any chosen direction, and the impact one 
can have, with any particular degree of wealth, is largely independent of 
the justice of the system under which that wealth was acquired. We 
would also reject the parameter view if we saw ethics mainly from the 
perspective of the container analogy. We might well regard living in a 
just society as one of the good things a life might contain. But we would 
have no reason to think that the other good things a life contained were 
diminished or compromised if it did not contain that one. If we are 
drawn, either self-consciously or unreflectively, to either of these views of 
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what living well is really like, then it is hardly likely that we would find 
the parameter thesis I described very plausible. 
But that thesis does not seem implausible from the perspective of the 
response analogy; on the contrary it seems, at least in prinicplc, 
irresistible. For it is natural to treat the economic circumstances in 
which we live as part of the challenge we face in trying to live well, and it 
is also natural to think that it is part of the challenge these circumstances 
offer that we should take no more resources for our own use than our fair 
share, and that we should form and maintain the kinds of relationships 
with others that are appropriate and possible only in circumstances free 
of justified resentment. If living well means responding in an appropri-
ate way to our circumstances, then in prinicple we cannot improve our 
life by capitalizing on more resources then we arc entitled to have, any 
more than an athlete really improves his performance by cheating or 
taking banned steroids. In each case, if it is the performance that we 
value, then we must test performance by asking how far it responds to 
the right challenge properly identified. If we think that an equal 
distribution is just, then we will not think that people who live in an 
egalitarian society, and have no more by way of resource or experience 
than is possible in such a society, arc thereby making a sacrifice. An 
athlete does not sacrifice by observing the rules: on the contrary it is 
observing the rules that makes a distinguished performance possible. 
The parameter thesis is less sweeping than the full platonic thesis I 
mentioned earlier. It does not deny that some few people can achieve 
enough in an unjust society to make their Jives, even from the point of 
view of the response analogy, better than they could have had under 
liberal equality. We cannot be confident that Michelangelo's life would 
have been as great as it was if he had been born into a society without 
great privilege. Nevertheless, if we suppose that living well is responding 
well, and that justice is one of the parameters a good response must in 
principle respect, then it will be true for most people that they cannot 
lead better lives in an unjust society than in a just one, even though they 
would have more money in the former. Very few people can achieve so 
transcendentally much with money they ought not to have that their 
achievements can outweigh the fact that they have been, as it were, 
cheating. 
Of course I realize that these points must seem to many of you (to 
put it kindly) balmy. Perhaps your skepticism means that you actually 
reject the response view ofliving well. And yet that view seems at least as 
plausible as, and matches our convictions about living well better than, 
either the impact or the container views. There is another possibility: 
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that we have not yet begun to think properly about what living well is 
like, or about the implications of the right account of living well for 
political philosophy. 
6. Justice and Sacrifice 
I now begin the return trip described in that last phrase, from ethics 
back to politics. I said earlier that if we adopted the parameter view, or 
any other that made justice a background condition affecting well-being, 
we would have to abandon the comparative-sacrifice structure for 
thinking about social justice, and I shall now review the reasons why. 
Suppose I adopt the parameter view, and am then asked-or ask 
myself-how great a sacrifice I would be making were the United States 
or Britain to redistribute wealth in accordance with some specified 
egalitarian program. Assume that I can make at least rough calculations 
about how much Jess income I would then have, and even (though this 
would be more problematic yet) what sort of housing, medical care, 
recreation and other resources I could buy with that income. I might 
perhaps be able to predict, knowing myself as I do, roughly how much I 
would enjoy the life I could lead, if my tastes and opinions did not 
change, and whether I would enjoy it much Jess than the life I now lead. 
All these predictions and surmises fall short, however, of a judgment 
about how good a life I would then be leading, in the critical sense, and 
that is what I must be able to judge, at least in rough measure, in order 
to know how much, if any, of a sacrifice would be involved. If I thought 
that the critical success of my own life depended in substantial part on 
my Jiving in and responding to the right circumstances, then I could not 
even roughly judge how well my life would go in a more egalitarian 
society without having already decided whether such a society would be 
more or Jess just than the circumstances in which I now live. I could not, 
that is, assess the justice of any proposed redistribution by comparing 
the sacrifice I would make if that redistribution were carried out with the 
losses others incur if the status quo is preserved, because I would have 
had to have made up my mind about the justice of the redistribution in 
order to gauge whether I would make any sacrifice at all if it were carried 
out. Nor can I prescind from justice by considering how great a sacrifice 
I would have made in other respects, that is, in elements of well-being 
apart from justice. That way of thinking is available when I treat justice 
as a component of well-being, but not when I treat it as a condition. 
Colleagues have suggested an objection to that claim, however. Even 
if we do accept that justice is a condition of well-being, they say, we can 
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still use the comparative-sacrifice strategy if we treat the comparative 
judgments it requires as in some way hypothetical. First, we identify all 
feasible distributions, and we decide how well each group fares in each 
distribution on the assumption that that distribution is just. In that way we 
can calculate roughly how much each group sacrifices or gains under 
that distribution compared with each of the other feasible distributions 
judged in the same way, that is, on the assumption that it too is just. 
Second, once that information is in hand, we can ask under which 
distribution the sacrifices so calculated are most reasonable, taking into 
account the maximal sacrifice demanded in each, the overall level of 
welfare of people making the sacrifice after it has been made, the 
numbers asked to sacrifice, and so forth. Third, we select the distribu-
tion in which the sacrifices arc overall most reasonable as the distribu-
tion that is really just. Finally, we count ourselves better off in that 
distribution, just because it is just, than in any of the others. 
Notice how the assumption this argument requires differs from a 
different and perfectly sensible assumption we might call the prosperity 
hypothesis: that people arc better off in a just society in which they have 
more than in another one, also just, in which they have less. The 
prosperity hypothesis is necessary to show why people who accept that 
justice is a condition of well-being nevertheless have an incentive toward 
economic progress. Suppose justice consists in equality of resources. 
Everyone is better off, even in the critical sense, in a society meeting that 
condition in which there is overall more wealth than in a different society 
also meeting the condition in which everyone has less. That judgment 
involves a comparison of two different communities-perhaps the same 
community at two different times-which differ in total resources, or in 
some other way such that people's holdings can be different in each and 
yet just in both. 
The argument my colleagues propose requires a very different 
assumption, however: that each of two very different distributions of the 
same resources of the same society can be thought to be just at the same 
time. That seems wrong. Justice supervenes on other facts: we cannot 
think that a distribution is just without thinking it is just for some 
reason, and this will be a reason why any very different feasible 
distribution is unjust. If a distribution in which people have roughly 
equal wealth is feasible, for example, and if that is what justice really 
requires, then a distribution in which wealth is distributed very 
unequally must be unjust. And vice versa. There is another fatal difficulty 
in the suggested procedure, moreover. It is self-defeating, because it 
supposes that we can sensibly assume that a particular distribution 1s 
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just without thereby making any assumption about the reasonableness of 
the sacrifices it demands. If we can, then justice does not depend on the 
reasonableness of sacrifice after all, and it would be a mistake to correct 
prior ascriptions about justice or injustice once information about 
comparative sacrifices is available. Suppose, for example, that the 
distribution in which some are rich and others poor is the consequence 
of free and authentic decisions by some to play while others work. If we 
assume, even hypothetically, that this distribution is a just one for that 
reason, we cannot then argue that it is unjust after all, on a second look, 
because the other distribution would not require as great an imbalance 
between holdings provided only that it, too, were just. 
So it seems that we really would have to abandon comparative-
sacrifice arguments about justice if we took up the parameter view of 
ethics, or any other view that makes justice a background condition of 
well-being. That would undercut, as I said earlier, some of the most 
familiar arguments for inequality. I mentioned one very popular 
argument for inequality earlier: that an economic scheme which allows 
rich people to keep the full profits of their investments is in the interests 
of nearly everyone, in the end, because better-off people will have an 
incentive to work and invest more under such a scheme. This argument 
would be ruled out if we agreed that most people can lead better lives 
under circumstances of justice than otherwise. It cannot then be an 
argument for the justice of some scheme that a community run on that 
scheme will have more aggregate resources; that would beg the question 
whether having more is actually in the interests of those who will have 
more. No doubt a just economic scheme would produce more resources 
for some section of the community than would any alternative scheme. 
Perhaps a just scheme would produce more resources for most people. 
But if we accept the parameter view we cannot argue that a scheme is 
just because it has those consequences, since they are not consequences we 
can approve, as even in the interests of those who will have more, unless 
we have some other reason for thinking the arrangement that produces 
them a just one. 
We can generalize. A'!)' scheme that tests the justice of an economic 
arrangement by measuring the welfare improvements and losses to 
particular groups in moving to that arrangement presupposes a com-
parative-sacrifice strategy and therefore rejects the parameter view of 
ethics. I believe, as I suggested earlier, that liberalism has more to gain 
than to lose from abandoning the comparative-sacrifice strategy. I will 
not pursue that theme this late in the lecture, however, but rather close 
by returning to the larger question of the connection between ethics and 
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political philosophy. Many of the most prominent liberal philosophers 
insist that political philosophy should be independent of any comprehen-
sive ethical positions. If my argument is right, their own theories are not 
fully neutral because, in different ways, they all depend on assuming 
that justice is at most a component of well-being rather than a condition 
of some kind. Those of you who remain convinced that the parameter 
view, and the response view of ethics from which it is drawn, are very 
implausible will not count that as either a problem or a serious violation 
of neutrality. But I hope I have provided reasons, in this lecture, why-
liberals should hedge their bets. We need arguments for liberal equality 
that someone can accept who understands his critical interests at least 
partly through the response analogy, and so believes, on that ground, 
that the best life for him is one lived in a just community. 
Non:s 
I. See the 'limner Lectures cited in note 2. 
2. These sections summarize, qualify and develop longer arguments I first presented in 
a set of'Hmner let·tures now published, as 1M Foundations '!f Libtral Equality, in the Tanner 
Foundation series, Volumt' XI. Those lectures and this one are part of a series of articles 
on liberal equality I hope tu revise for ll book on that subject. Sec What Is EqUtJlityi' Parts 1 
and 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Spring, Summer 1981; Part 3, 73 Iowa Law Journal 
(July 1988); Part 4, 22 San Francist·n Law Review (1987); Libtral Community, California 
Law Review (1989); Equality, Dmwcrac;• and Constitution: Wt the ProfJlt in Court, 28 Alberta 
Law Review (1990). In the Tanner lectures I take up the question not treated ht·re: how we 
might llr!,'llC about justice in general, and for <'quality in particular, if we gave up the 
comparative-sacrifice schema. 
3. One difference between the two kinds of interests is particularly important to the 
present argument. Critical interest has an objective dimension that volitional interest docs 
not: people can be wrong, very much wrong, about where their critical interests lie, 
though not, at least in the same din·ct sense, about what it is that they actually want. 
Someone's discovery, toward the end, that a life he had thought full of excitement and 
enjoyment has in fact been wasted is a common enough tragedy, not only in literature but 
in real life as wc:ll. And of course someone might make a mistake of that kind that he never 
discovers. So it is not a decisive argument, against the parameter view I am trying to 
defend, that very few people think they could ever be better off with less resources. Most 
people could all he making a serious mistake. 
4. See Footnote 2. 
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